This paper extends the discussion of guanxi beyond instrumental evaluations and advances a normative assessment of guanxi. Our discussion departs from previous analyses by not merely asking, Does guanxi work? but rather Should corporations use guanxi? The analysis begins with a review of traditional guanxi definitions and the changing economic and legal environment in China, both necessary precursors to understanding the role of guanxi in Chinese business transactions. This review leads us to suggest that there are distinct types of, and (...) uses for guanxi. We identify the potentially problematic aspects of certain forms of guanxi from a normative perspective, noting among other things, the close association of particular types of guanxi with corruption and bribery. We conclude that there are many different forms of guanxi that may have distinct impacts on economic efficiency and the well-being of ordinary Chinese citizens. Consistent with Donaldson and Dunfee (1999), we advocate a particularistic analysis of the different forms of guanxi. (shrink)

Despite its theoretical importance, little is known about how semantic memory structure facilitates and constrains creative idea generation. We examine whether the semantic richness of a concept has both benefits and costs to creative idea generation. Specifically, we tested whether cue set size—an index of semantic richness reflecting the average number of elements associated with a given concept—impacts the quantity (fluency) and quality (originality) of responses generated during the Alternate Uses Task (AUT). Across four studies, we show that low-association, sparse, (...) AUT cues benefit originality at the cost of fluency compared to high-association, rich, AUT cues. Furthermore, we found an interaction with individual differences in fluid intelligence in the low-association AUT cues, suggesting that constraints of sparse semantic knowledge can be overcome with top-down intervention. Our findings indicate that semantic richness differentially impacts the quality and quantity of generated ideas, and that cognitive control processes can facilitate idea production when conceptual knowledge is limited. (shrink)

What makes it the case that an utterance constitutes an illocutionary act of a given kind? This is the central question of speech-act theory. Answers to it—i.e., theories of speech acts—have proliferated. Our main goal in this chapter is to clarify the logical space into which these different theories fit. -/- We begin, in Section 1, by dividing theories of speech acts into five families, each distinguished from the others by its account of the key ingredients in illocutionary acts. Are (...) speech acts fundamentally a matter of convention or intention? Or should we instead think of them in terms of the psychological states they express, in terms of the effects that it is their function to produce, or in terms of the norms that govern them? In Section 2, we take up the highly influential idea that speech acts can be understood in terms of their effects on a conversation’s context or “score”. Part of why this idea has been so useful is that it allows speech-act theorists from the five families to engage at a level of abstraction that elides their foundational disagreements. In Section 3, we investigate some of the motivations for the traditional distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force, and some of the ways in which this distinction has been undermined by recent work. In Section 4, we survey some of the ways in which speech-act theory has been applied to issues outside semantics and pragmatics, narrowly construed. (shrink)

DNA helicases catalyze the disruption of the hydrogen bonds that hold the two strands of double‐stranded DNA together. This energy‐requiring unwinding reaction results in the formation of the single‐stranded DNA required as a template or reaction intermediate in DNA replication, repair and recombination. A combination of biochemical and genetic studies have been used to probe and define the roles of the multiple DNA helicases found in E. coli. This work and similar efforts in eukaryotic cells, although far from complete, have (...) established that DNA helicases are essential components of the machinery that interacts with the DNA molecule. (shrink)

Insight experiences are sudden, persuasive, and can accompany valuable new ideas in science and art. In this preregistered experiment, we aim to validate a novel visceral and continuous measure of insight problem solving and to test whether real-time and embodied feelings of insight can predict correct solutions. We report several findings. Consistent with recent work, we find a strong positive relationship between Aha moments and accuracy for problems that demand implicit processing. We also found that the intensity of the insight (...) experience further predicted the accuracy of solutions and participants naturally embodied the intensity of their insight experiences by squeezing the dynamometer more tightly. Intriguingly, this unintentional embodiment further predicted the accuracy of solutions. We suggest that the dynamometer complements previous measures by (1) simultaneously capturing both process and feeling in real-time, (2) highlights the value of measuring Aha moments on a continuum of intensity, and (3) firmly establishes that the impulsive feeling of Aha can carry information about the veracity of an idea. We discuss the findings in light of a recent theoretical account of how feelings of insight may act as a heuristic to select ideas from the stream of consciousness. (shrink)

We present two studies that examine the effects of guanxi on multiple social groups from the perspective of Chinese business people. Study 1 (N = 203) tests the difference in perceived effects of six guanxi contextualizations. Study 2 (N = 195) examines the duality of guanxi as either helpful or harmful to social groups, depending on the contextualization. Findings suggest guanxi may result in positive as well as negative outcomes for focal actors and the aggregate.

Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) is widely recoginized as a leading figure in the Western tradition of Philosophy. These volumes are designed to allow current debates on key themes to studied without seeking additional sources.

This anthology is intended primarily to provide students of theology with some of the basic writings of the major thinkers who have contributed to the development of the movement known as "process theology." Because of the content students of philosophy will likewise find it useful. The editor begins the work with an introduction in which he ably traces in broad perspective the various ways in which a mental attitude stressing process is reflected in contemporary culture, philosophy, and theology. The first (...) part of the volume then provides essays that center on process thought as this has emerged from the writings of Alfred North Whitehead and his American disciples. Two essays in this part are concerned with tracing the development of process thought, the one by Norman Pittenger centering on its historical evolution from Whitehead through Hartshorne and others into a distinct theological movement, whereas the one by Charles Hartshorne is concerned with the inner development of process thought as a noetic capable of dealing with relational reality. In other essays in this part Bernard Meland comments on the value of process thought in providing an imagery and concepts congenial to contemporary man in his struggle to understand his experience, and Bernard M. Loomer examines in detail the empirical basis and methodology central to Whitehead’s philosophy. The essays in the second part focus on the relationship between God and the world as this relationship is interpreted by process thinkers. Here selections include the final chapter of Whitehead’s Process and Reality, Hartshorne’s suggestive account of the philosophical and religious uses of the term "God," Schubert Ogden’s attempt to defend a concept of God modeled on process thought as more conformable to biblical testimony than the concept of God classical in Christian thought, Walter Stoke’s endeavor to integrate features of process thought within a more Thomistic framework relative to the being of God, and two essays by Daniel Day Williams and John B. Cobb, Jr. on the relationship between God and world and God and man. Essays in the third part, called "Christ and Redemption," reflect the efforts of three Whiteheadian-inspired theologians, Meland, Pittenger, and Henry Nelson Wieman, to rethink the Christian doctrine of the incarnation within the framework provided by process thought. In the fourth part of the work attention is directed from Whitehead to another major source of contemporary process theology, Teilhard de Chardin. The essays include Theodosius Dobzhansky’s lengthy critical appreciation of the major directions in Teilhard’s vision of the universe, Teilhard’s own views on a cosmic Christology, a development of his views on this topic by Henri de Lubac, and other studies of aspects of Teilhard’s thought by N. M. Wildiers, George Crespy, and Christopher F. Mooney. An appendix includes a comparative study of the metaphysics of Teilhard and Whitehead by Ian G. Barbour. A useful bibliography completes the anthology.—W. E. M. (shrink)

Although eye tracking has been used extensively to assess cognitions for static stimuli, recent research suggests that the link between gaze and cognition may be more tenuous for dynamic stimuli such as videos. Part of the difficulty in convincingly linking gaze with cognition is that in dynamic stimuli, gaze position is strongly influenced by exogenous cues such as object motion. However, tests of the gaze‐cognition link in dynamic stimuli have been done on only a limited range of stimuli often characterized (...) by highly organized motion. Also, analyses of cognitive contrasts between participants have been mostly been limited to categorical contrasts among small numbers of participants that may have limited the power to observe more subtle influences. We, therefore, tested for cognitive influences on gaze for screen‐captured instructional videos, the contents of which participants were tested on. Between‐participant scanpath similarity predicted between‐participant similarity in responses on test questions, but with imperfect consistency across videos. We also observed that basic gaze parameters and measures of attention to centers of interest only inconsistently predicted learning, and that correlations between gaze and centers of interest defined by other‐participant gaze and cursor movement did not predict learning. It, therefore, appears that the search for eye movement indices of cognition during dynamic naturalistic stimuli may be fruitful, but we also agree that the tyranny of dynamic stimuli is real, and that links between eye movements and cognition are highly dependent on task and stimulus properties. (shrink)

Background Genuine uncertainty on superiority of one intervention over the other is called equipoise. Physician-investigators in randomized controlled trials need equipoise at least in studies with more than minimal risks. Ideally, this equipoise is also present in patient-participants. In pediatrics, data on equipoise are lacking. We hypothesize that 1) lack of equipoise at enrolment among parents may reduce recruitment; 2) lack of equipoise during participation may reduce retention in patients assigned to a less favoured treatment-strategy. Methods We compared preferences of (...) parents/patients at enrolment, documented by a questionnaire, with preferences developed during follow-up by an interview-study to investigate equipoise of child-participants and parents in the BeSt-for-Kids-study. This trial in new-onset Juvenile Idiopathic Arthritis-patients consists of three strategies. One strategy comprises initial treatment with a biological disease-modifying-antirheumatic-drug, currently not standard-of-care. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 23 parents and 7 patients, median 11 months after enrolment. Results Initially most parents and children were not in equipoise. Parents/patients who refused participation, regularly declined due to specific preferences. Many participating families preferred the biological-first-strategy. They participated to have a chance for this initial treatment, and would even consider stopping trial-participation when not randomized for it. Their conviction of superiority of the biological-first strategy was based on knowledge from internet and close relations. According to four parents, the physician-investigator preferred the biological-first-strategy, but the majority stated that she had no preferred strategy. In phase 2, preferences tended to change to the treatment actually received. Conclusions Lack of equipoise during enrolment did not reduce study recruitment, mainly due to the fact that preferred treatment was only available within the study. Still, when developing a trial it is important to evaluate whether the physicians’ research question is in line with preferences of the patient-group. By exploring so-called ‘informed patient-group’-equipoise, successful recruitment may be enhanced and bias avoided. In our study, lack of equipoise during trial-participation did not reduce retention in those assigned to a less favoured option. We observed a change for preference towards treatment actually received, possibly explained by comparable outcomes in all three arms. (shrink)

How shall we understand apparently teleological systems? What explains their persistence and their plasticity? Here I argue that all seemingly goal-directed systems—e.g., a food-seeking organism, human-made devices like thermostats and torpedoes, biological development, human goal seeking, and the evolutionary process itself—share a common organization. Specifically, they consist of an entity that moves within a larger containing structure, one that directs its behavior in a general way without precisely determining it. If so, then teleology lies within the domain of the theory (...) of compositional hierarchies. (shrink)

The attempt to find usable diagrams fornterms of the sort devised by John Venn seems to have originated with Venn himself, who published diagrams for up to five classes (the fifth class, however, was shaped like a doughnut, and contained an area outside itself — like the hole in the doughnut). Venn then suggested that “if we wanted to use a diagram forsixterms (x, y, z, w, v, u) the best plan would probably be to taketwofive-term figures, one for theupart (...) and one for the non-upart of all the other combinations …” Such a method would, as Venn admits, be somewhat confusing to the eye, and thus fail to fulfil one of the major purposes of the diagram; nevertheless, it is a method which could be extended to covernclasses.Venn also suggests (but without illustration) another method for drawing diagrams fornterms: “… the rule of formation would be very simple. We should merely have to begin by drawing any closed figure, and then proceed to draw others subject to the one condition that each intersect once, and once only, all the existing subdivisions produced by those which had gone before.” Then, in a rather surprising footnote, he adds: “It will be found that when we adhere to continuous figures, instead of the discontinuous five-term figure given above, there is a tendency for the resultant outlines thus successively drawn to assume a comb-like shape after the first four or five. If we begin by circles or other rounded figures the teeth are curved, if by parallelograms then they are straight. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility”Daniel W. Shuman (bio)Stephen Braude’s essay, “Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility,” discusses a number of important issues about the moral and legal responsibility of persons diagnosed with multiple personality disorder (MPD), known in DSM-IV as Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). One issue that is fundamental to this debate, which Braude does not address, however, is the empirical reality underlying the debate. Does MPD/DID (...) exist? A prerequisite to a debate about the legal consequences of MPD/DID is legally sufficient proof of its existence and its behavioral consequences.Proof that MPD/DID exists, its impact on legal standards of responsibility, and that the defendant suffers from it, must come from expert testimony; it is not part of the common knowledge or experience of the typical judge or juror. Courts are, however, increasingly, unwilling to assume that because an expert has impressive qualifications, he or she will necessarily present scientifically valid evidence. Particularly in cases of psychiatric and psychological evidence, courts that once looked solely at the expert’s qualifications to determine the admissibility for expert scientific evidence, now understand that the expert’s qualifications are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the presentation of accurate expert testimony. Courts increasingly want to know how experts know what they claim to know and whether their methods of knowing meet the hallmarks of good science.Thus, from a legal standpoint, a prerequisite to admissibility of the evidence that serves as a basis for a discussion of the legal implications of MPD/DID is rigorous scientific proof of its existence. Proof of the existence of MPD/DID has not, however, been the subject of rigorous scientific research, but instead has consisted of non-falsifiable clinical experience where the risk of iatrogenesis (i.e., hypnosis and suggestion) is ever present. While these clinical observations and opinions may ultimately be proven valid by subsequent research, there is simply no way to know whether that is so in the absence of rigorous scientific research. If proof of the existence of MPD/DID is clinically but not scientifically grounded, legal rules based upon it are suspect. Moreover, claims of MPD/DID often arise in a legal context where there are significant benefits to be gained from receiving the diagnosis which heightens the importance of rigorous scientific scrutiny.Diagnostic validity and reliability matters in different ways in the forensic context than it does in the therapeutic context. These contextual differences [End Page 59] are reflected in disparate standards for scrutinizing each. There is no threshold requirement, for example, that a psychotherapist prove that a diagnostic category is valid or that a psychotherapeutic treatment used for a person suffering from it is generally recognized as safe and effective before using it; however, there is a threshold requirement of rigorous scientific scrutiny before admission of this information in evidence. If a therapist’s diagnostic hypothesis that there are two personality states influencing a patient’s behavior is not borne out, it can be revised in later sessions. Even if MPD/DID does not exist, treatment that assumes it does may nonetheless be effective because therapeutic outcome is more closely tied to the nature of the therapist-patient relationship than the content of therapy, or because multiple personality states is an effective therapeutic metaphor. Moreover, if the patient is not satisfied that the diagnosis or treatment rendered is helpful, the patient can leave therapy or seek another therapist.In contrast, judicial determinations are a one-shot determination which cannot be revisited in light of subsequently acquired knowledge. The defendant/patient is not free to change courts, or withdraw from the legal proceedings. Thus, it would be entirely appropriate for psychiatrists and psychologists to treat patients presenting symptoms of what they label MPD/DID and for courts to reject exculpatory evidence from psychiatrists and psychologists of that disorder.Related ArticlesFeature Article: Multiple Personality and Moral ResponsibilityCommentary: Commentary by ClarkCommentary: Commentary by ShumanDaniel W. Shuman Daniel W. Shuman, Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75235, USA.Copyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.2 (2003) 193-194 [Access article in PDF] A Comment on Christopher Ciocchetti:"The Responsibility of the Psychopathic Offender" Daniel W. Shuman Questions of responsibility for serious harm are complex and potentially divisive. The way in which we frame these questions and the criteria by which we assess answers to them are colored, in part, by the lens though which we view them. I am a (...) law professor whose writings includes issues relating to criminal responsibility of person with mentally disabilities and I come to this commentary from that perspective. For me questions of moral responsibility raise psychological and philosophical, as well as legal, questions.Ciocchetti's (2003) paper addressees the criminal responsibility of the psychopathic offender. Not sure quite what the author meant by this label, I began to try to understand the concept of psychopathic offender by picking up my DSM-IV-TR and found no reference to such a diagnostic category. Absent a handy reference in the DSM, I looked in the paper for some other definition or recognition of the category of psychopathic offender and found no satisfactory grounding in any body of sound research. Left with the author's unsupported assertions that such a category of persons exists and that they behave in ways the author asks me to accept without support, my lawyer instincts cautioned me to proceed carefully. The psychopathic offender the author describes might well exist, but I am not persuaded of that, nor would be my legal colleagues, absent proof.Next, to the author's thesis that "[t]he offender must have the capacities necessary to understand relationships to justify holding that offender responsible" (p. 176) and that because psychopaths lack this capacity they should not be held criminally responsible. Is the author proposing a new test for criminal responsibility? Certainly no test for criminal nonresponsibility based on mental disability (i.e., insanity defense) in Anglo-American jurisprudence, or any other with which I am familiar, makes status (i.e., a diagnostic category) exculpatory for criminal responsibility. Rather, every test addresses the impact of a mental illness or disorder on the cognitive or volitional capacity of the offender at the time of the offense. The author offers no reason to reject the approach taken for the last several hundred years [End Page 193] by Anglo-American jurisprudence. Moreover, to the extent that status or diagnostic category is relevant in the insanity defense in Anglo-American jurisprudence, character or personality disorders (the genus to which I take it that psychopathy belongs) are often specifically excluded from consideration. For example, the Texas Penal Code (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.01 (Vernon 1994)) states that:It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong. The term "mental disease or defect" does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.The federal Insanity Defense Reform Act raises the same issue: The government relies on the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 17, which states: "The concept of severity was added to emphasize that non-psychotic behavior disorders or neuroses such as an 'inadequate personality,' 'immature personality,' or a pattern of 'antisocial tendencies' do not constitute the defense.".... The government argues that because Dr. Lorenz would have testified that Salava was not psychotic but suffered from antisocial personality disorder, his testimony was not relevant to either prong of the insanity defense under the statute.... As a general matter, the government's point is well-taken. It seems clear that Congress intended by its inclusion of the modifier "severe" to place certain "disorders" outside the purview of the insanity defense altogether. United States v. Salava, 978 F.2d 320, 323 (7th Cir. 1992) Nowhere in the paper does Chiochetti acknowledge or address these societal judgments of moral responsibility that have already rejected a far more modest version of his proposal in categorically ruling out character or personality disorders from inclusion as... (shrink)

Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

BackgroundAlthough the number of reporting guidelines has grown rapidly, few have gone through an updating process. The STARD statement (Standards for Reporting Diagnostic Accuracy), published in 2003 to help improve the transparency and completeness of reporting of diagnostic accuracy studies, was recently updated in a systematic way. Here, we describe the steps taken and a justification for the changes made.ResultsA 4-member Project Team coordinated the updating process; a 14-member Steering Committee was regularly solicited by the Project Team when making critical (...) decisions. First, a review of the literature was performed to identify topics and items potentially relevant to the STARD updating process. After this, the 85 members of the STARD Group were invited to participate in two online surveys to identify items that needed to be modified, removed from, or added to the STARD checklist. Based on the results of the literature review process, 33 items were presented to the STARD Group in the online survey: 25 original items and 8 new items; 73 STARD Group members (86 %) completed the first survey, and 79 STARD Group members (93 %) completed the second survey.Then, an in-person consensus meeting was organized among the members of the Project Team and Steering Committee to develop a consensual draft version of STARD 2015. This version was piloted in three rounds among a total of 32 expert and non-expert users. Piloting mostly led to rewording of items. After this, the update was finalized. The updated STARD 2015 list now consists of 30 items. Compared to the previous version of STARD, three original items were each converted into two new items, four original items were incorporated into other items, and seven new items were added.ConclusionsAfter a systematic updating process, STARD 2015 provides an updated list of 30 essential items for reporting diagnostic accuracy studies. (shrink)

Logique et existenceDeleuze à propos des « conditions du réel »Pour Deleuze, l’un des problèmes fondamentaux d’une théorie de la pensée est de savoir comment la pensée peut quitter la sphère du possible pour penser le réel, c’est-àdire pour penser l’existence elle-même. La position du réel semble être hors du concept. Des pré-kantiens comme Leibniz approchaient ce problème par le biais de la distinction entre vérités d’essence et vérités d’existence, alors que des post-kantiens comme Maimon l’approchaient par la distinction entre (...) les conditions de l’expérience possible et celles de l’expérience réelle. La logique classique définit la sphère du possible par trois principes logiques – l’identité, la non-contradiction et le tiers-exclu – et la présente étude examine les trois grandes trajectoires qui, dans cette histoire de la philosophie, ont tenté d’utiliser l’un de ces trois principes classiques pour pénétrer l’existence ellemême : 1) Leibniz (et les pré-kantiens) cherchait à étendre le principe de d’identité àl’existence entière ; 2) Hegel (et les post-kantiens) cherchait à étendre le principe de non-contradiction à la totalité de l’expérience ; et 3) le groupe des penseurs appelés de manière assez large « existentialistes » cherchait à étendre le principe du tiers-exclu à la totalité de l’existence. La conclusion examine les raisons pour lesquelles Deleuze a été fasciné par chacune de ces tentatives philosophiques pour « penser l’existence », tout en pensant néanmoins qu’elles ont toutes échoué ; et pourquoi aussi il a fini par développer sa propre réponse au problème en faisant appel à un principe de différence.Logica e EsistenzaLe ‘Condizioni del reale’ in DeleuzePer Deleuze, uno dei problemi fondamentali per una teoria del pensiero è: come può il pensiero abbandonare la sfera del possibile per pensare il reale, ossia, pensare l’esistenza stessa? La posizione del reale sembra essere fuori dal concetto. Prekantiani come Leibniz affrontano questo problema in termini di distinzione fra verità dell’essenza e verità dell’esistenza, mentre post-kantiani come Maimon affrontano il problema in termini di distinzione fra condizioni dell’esperienza possibile e condizioni dell’esperienza reale. La logica classica ha definito la sfera del possibile secondo tre principi logici – identità, non-contraddizione, terzo escluso – e questo saggio analizza tre grandi ‘parabole’ della storia della filosofia che hanno tentato di usare uno di questi tre principi della logica per penetrare l’esistenza stessa: (1) Leibniz (e i pre-kantiani) hanno tentato di estendere il principio di identità a tutta l’esistenza; (2) Hegel (ei post-kantiani) hanno tentato di estendere il principio di non-contraddizione a tutta l’esistenza; (3) il gruppo di pensatori (solo approssimativamente legati fra loro) chiamati “esistenzialisti” ha tentato di estendere il principio del terzo escluso all’esistenza. La conclusione analizza sia le ragioni per le quali Deleuze era affascinato da ciascuno di questi tentativi filosofici di “pensare l’esistenza” nonostante fosse convinto che essi avessero fallito, sia i motivi per cui egli in conclusione traccia la propria risposta al problema facendo appello al principio della differenza. (shrink)

In an era of domestic and economic reform wherein deregulation/privatisation becomes a priority, short shift has too often been given to evaluative analyses of business activities. Evaluative monitoring and oversight are especially needful in highly competitive international business environments, where the temptations are very strong to adjudge individual effectiveness by the sole criterion of the bottom line. But what additional or alternative criteria should be administered, and by whom, is less clear. That any but the most vague Judeo-Christian or secular (...) ethical standards are applicable (e.g. notions of fairness) is widely contested. The debate is significantly only widened when doing business across national borders involving peoples from different cultures and languages. This section is devoted to explicating the normative role of international codes of conduct for guiding the decision making of managers involved in multinational operations, and clarifying what ethical frameworks are available to the international manager for taking decisions which require selecting actions inconsistent with either home or host country demands. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian InternalismDaniel E. PalmerGeorge W. Harris. Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Pp. xi + 434. Cloth, $60.00.Contemporary philosophers have found substantial resources in the ethical writings of both Aristotle and Kant. Together Aristotelian-inspired virtue ethics and Kantian constructivism have not only contributed greatly to the resurgence of interest in normative theory in recent (...) decades, but have also provided the most prominent alternatives to the utilitarianism that has dominated Anglo-American ethics for so long. However, the development of these ethical projects has been carried out largely independently of one another. In Agent-Centered Morality, George Harris helps to overcome this lacuna by comparing and contrasting these two competing versions of [End Page 449] morality. As such, this work is a welcome addition to the literature both as a survey of recent work in Aristotelian and Kantian ethics as well as an account of the many ways in which they converge and diverge in their corresponding treatments of practical rationality.Harris begins by noting that the appeal of both the Aristotelian and Kantian models is that they attempt to generate a foundation for ethics within an account of practical reason, and thus to ground morality within a deliberative perspective that connects the demands of morality with an agent's own meaningful commitments. As such, Harris correctly argues that these projects have much more in common than has sometimes been supposed. The central question that Harris raises in this book is which account of practical reason is best suited for this task. His thesis is that the Aristotelian model gives us a more plausible picture of the role of norms within practical rationality.The major distinction between the Aristotelian and the Kantian models according to Harris is that while on the Aristotelian model the norms made use of in practical judgments are symmetric in their regulative function, the Kantian model provides an asymmetrical account of norms. To arbitrate between these two views, Harris proposes an integration test. The point of the integration test is to assure that our account of practical rationality and the function of regulative norms that it provides can support the integrity of rational agents. Minimally then, the test will favor the account of practical rationality that best "integrates the various concerns of rational human agents in a way that preserves integrity" (32).While the above vastly simplifies Harris's rich treatment of this issue, it nonetheless allows us to see how Harris goes about arguing for the superiority of the Aristotelian view. For Harris maintains that the Aristotelian symmetrical model integrates regulative norms better than the Kantian model. To show why, Harris makes use of a number of examples to demonstrate that regulative norms function in a symmetrical fashion in regards to one another for the agent of integrity. For instance, to show that the norm of impartial respect is sometimes regulated by the norm of impartial sympathy, Harris gives an example of someone who breaks a lunch date in order to help a dog that is being mistreated. Likewise, Harris uses examples to argue that sometimes even partial norms, like that of parental concern, regulate the impartial norm of respect. Harris believes that these cases demonstrate that the regulative norms made use of in practical deliberation must function in a symmetrical fashion. Thus, Harris thinks we have good reason to reject the Kantian view "that the integrative function of practical reason is achieved by an impartial norm that is asymmetrical in its regulative function" (127).Though interesting and worthy of attention, I am not convinced that Harris makes use of the most plausible understanding of the Kantian model of practical rationality in his central argument. By focusing almost exclusively upon the idea of respect, Harris assumes that the best reading of the Kantian project will be founded primarily in the idea of impartial respect. However, if we adopt a procedural understanding of the Categorical Imperative, a plausible case could be made that a Kantian account of practical rationality can account for the examples that Harris makes use of just as well as the Aristotelian... (shrink)

This new annotated translation of Chapter Six of Hegel's _Phenomenology of Spirit_, the joint product of a group of scholars that included H. S. Harris, George di Giovanni, John W. Burbidge, and Kenneth Schmitz, represents an advance in accuracy and fluency on previous translations into English of this core chapter of the Phenomenology. Its notes and commentary offer both novice and scholar more guidance to this text than is available in any other translation, and it is thus well suited for (...) use in survey courses. (shrink)

Psychopathy refers to a range of complex behaviors and personality traits, including callousness and antisocial behavior, typically studied in criminal populations. Recent studies have used self-reports to examine psychopathic traits among noncriminal samples. The goal of the current study was to examine the underlying factor structure of the Self-Report of Psychopathy Scale–Short Form (SRP-SF) across complementary samples and examine the impact of gender on factor structure. We examined the structure of the SRP-SF among 2,554 young adults from three undergraduate samples (...) and a high-risk young adult sample. Using confirmatory factor analysis, a four-correlated factor model and a four-bifactor model showed good fit to the data. Evidence of weak invariance was found for both models across gender. These findings highlight that the SRP-SF is a useful measure of low-level psychopathic traits in noncriminal samples, although the underlying factor structure may not fully translate across men and women. (shrink)

1 Evidence-based policy requires researchers to provide the answers to ecological questions that are of interest to policy makers. To find out what those questions are in the UK, representatives from 28 organizations involved in policy, together with scientists from 10 academic institutions, were asked to generate a list of questions from their organizations. 2 During a 2-day workshop the initial list of 1003 questions generated from consulting at least 654 policy makers and academics was used as a basis for (...) generating a short list of 100 questions of significant policy relevance. Short-listing was decided on the basis of the preferences of the representatives from the policy-led organizations. 3 The areas covered included most major issues of environmental concern in the UK, including agriculture, marine fisheries, climate change, ecosystem function and land management. 4 The most striking outcome was the preference for general questions rather than narrow ones. The reason is that policy is driven by broad issues rather than specific ones. In contrast, scientists are frequently best equipped to answer specific questions. This means that it may be necessary to extract the underpinning specific question before researchers can proceed. 5 Synthesis and applications. Greater communication between policy makers and scientists is required in order to ensure that applied ecologists are dealing with issues in a way that can feed into policy. It is particularly important that applied ecologists emphasize the generic value of their work wherever possible. (shrink)

A pseudo-natural algorithm for the word problem of a finitely presented group is an algorithm which not only tells us whether or not a word w equals 1 in the group but also gives a derivation of 1 from w when w equals 1. In [13], [14] Madlener and Otto show that, if we measure complexity of a primitive recursive algorithm by its level in the Grzegorczyk hierarchy, there are groups in which a pseudo-natural algorithm is arbitrarily more complicated than (...) an algorithm which simply solves the word problem. In a given group the lowest degree of complexity that can be realised by a pseudo-natural algorithm is essentially the derivational complexity of that group. Thus the result separates the derivational complexity of the word problem of a finitely presented group from its intrinsic complexity. The proof given in [13] involves the construction of a finitely presented group G from a Turing machine T such that the intrinsic complexity of the word problem for G reflects the complexity of the halting problem of T, while the derivational complexity of the word problem for G reflects the runtime complexity of T. The proof of one of the crucial lemmas in [13] is only sketched, and part of the purpose of this paper is to give the full details of this proof. We will also obtain a variant of their proof, using modular machines rather than Turing machines. As for several other results, this simplifies the proofs considerably. MSC: 03D40, 20F10. (shrink)

Rationale: Deep brain stimulation (DBS) of the hippocampus is proposed for enhancement of memory impaired by injury or disease. Many pre-clinical DBS paradigms can be addressed in epilepsy patients undergoing intracranial monitoring for seizure localization, since they already have electrodes implanted in brain areas of interest. Even though epilepsy is usually not a memory disorder targeted by DBS, the studies can nevertheless model other memory-impacting disorders, such as Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). Methods: Human patients undergoing Phase II invasive monitoring for (...) intractable epilepsy were implanted with depth electrodes capable of recording neurophysiological signals. Subjects performed a delayed-match-to-sample (DMS) memory task while hippocampal ensembles from CA1 and CA3 cell layers were recorded to estimate a multi-input, multi-output (MIMO) model of CA3-to-CA1 neural encoding and a memory decoding model (MDM) to decode memory information from CA3 and CA1 neuronal signals. After model estimation, subjects again performed the DMS task while either MIMO-based or MDM-based patterned stimulation was delivered to CA1 electrode sites during the encoding phase of the DMS trials. Each subject was sorted (post hoc) by prior experience of repeated and/or mild-to-moderate brain injury (RMBI), TBI, or no history (control) and scored for percentage successful delayed recognition (DR) recall on stimulated vs. non-stimulated DMS trials. The subject’s medical history was unknown to the experimenters until after individual subject memory retention results were scored. Results: When examined compared to control subjects, both TBI and RMBI subjects showed increased memory retention in response to both MIMO and MDM-based hippocampal stimulation. Furthermore, effects of stimulation were also greater in subjects who were evaluated as having pre-existing mild-to-moderate memory impairment. Conclusion: These results show that hippocampal stimulation for memory facilitation was more beneficial for subjects who had previously suffered a brain injury (other than epilepsy), compared to control (epilepsy) subjects who had not suffered a brain injury. This study demonstrates that the epilepsy/intracranial recording model can be extended to test the ability of DBS to restore memory function in subjects who previously suffered a brain injury other than epilepsy, and support further investigation into the beneficial effect of DBS in TBI patients. (shrink)

We are big fans of propositions. But we are not big fans of the proposed by Mitchell et al. The authors ignore the critical role played by implicit, non-inferential processes in biological cognition, overestimate the work that propositions alone can do, and gloss over substantial differences in how different kinds of animals and different kinds of cognitive processes approximate propositional representations.